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dversarial expert testimony has been fraught with problems of 
partisanship since “just about the moment of its invention.”1  
Partisan expert witnesses in American courtrooms are anything but a 
recent phenomenon,2 and court opinions and law review articles 
published over the past two centuries confirm both the presence and 
awareness of such bias.3  The basic origins of these problems were 
identified long ago and continue to be cited today, yet little or no 
progress has been made toward their elimination.4  When experts’ 
testimony concerns scientific evidence, partisanship problems are 
further compounded by the complex theories underlying the 
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1 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2008). 
2 See id. at 1009–11; Posting of David H. Kaye, Hot Tubbing: Old Wine in New Bottles 
for Expert Witnesses to Science & Law Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/science 
_law/2008/08/old-news-on-exp.html (Aug. 11, 2008). 
3 See Kaye, supra note 2. 
4 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1015; see also Lord Abinger v. Ashton 17 L.R.Eq. 358, 
373–75 (Ch. 1873) (identifying bias among experts and problems of experts being paid for 
their testimony). 
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testimony, the societal views of the science, and the uncertainty 
intrinsic to every scientific discipline.  The increased prevalence of 
science in the courtroom has elevated concern over these difficulties 
and has attracted the attention of judges, legislators, scholars, and 
practicing attorneys alike.5 
Some critics of the current system argue that the best way to 
eliminate negative effects of adversarial expert testimony is to do 
away with adversarial experts altogether.6  This drastic approach has 
not been adopted for many reasons, including predictions that such 
modifications would fail to solve some of the significant problems 
attributed to this form of testimony.7  Therefore, more creative 
approaches to this conundrum must be considered, including the 
approaches employed by foreign judiciaries.  Over the last decade, 
Australia has developed a method to reduce problems associated with 
adversarial expert testimony that may have applications within the 
American judicial system.  The Australian innovation, formally 
known as concurrent expert testimony but more commonly known as 
the hot tub method or hot tubbing, involves a colloquium setting 
where multiple experts deliver their testimony and field questions 
from the judge, counselors, and each other in a single session.8  
Advocates for this procedure claim it mitigates many adverse effects 
that arise from each side hiring and presenting their own experts.9  An 
examination of factors that complicate scientific testimony, common 
sources of bias, details of the hot tub’s use in Australia, and key 
differences between the American and Australian judiciaries reveals 
that, while not always an ideal fit, the general principles of the hot tub 
procedure may find a home in American courtrooms. 
Part I of this Comment examines the causes and challenges 
associated with conflicting scientific experts.  Part II identifies and 
distinguishes common sources of bias that may further complicate the 
evaluation of dueling expert testimony.  Possible solutions to these 
problems are explored in Part III, leading into an explanation of 
Australia’s hot tub method and an evaluation of its strengths and 
 
5 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6 See, e.g., Hon. Garry Downes, Problems with Expert Evidence: Are Single or Court-
Appointed Experts the Answer?, 15 J. JUD. ADMIN. 185 (2006). 
7 See id. 
8 E.g., Elizabeth Cheeseman, Hot Tubbing: Concurrent Expert Evidence, BARNEWS: J. 
NEW S. WALES B. ASS’N, Summer 2006/2007, at 54; Hon. Peter Heerey, Recent 
Australian Developments, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 386, 390–91 (2004). 
9 See, e.g., Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
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weaknesses in Part IV.  Part V discusses factors to consider in 
determining whether or not particular testimony lends itself to the hot 
tub procedure, while Part VI focuses specifically on ways the 
procedure could further ease the evaluation of dueling scientific 
expert testimony.  Part VII identifies both the similarities and 
differences between the American and Australian court systems, as 
well as the differences that materially affect the applicability of the 
hot tub in the United States.  Part VIII addresses some of these 
difficulties and suggests modifications to adapt the hot tub method to 
the American courts. 
I 
COMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Of all the fields of expertise from which witnesses may be called, 
scientific expert testimony deserves special consideration.10  In recent 
years, “[s]cientific and technical evidence has increased dramatically  
. . . both in its frequency and its complexity.”11  Different areas of 
science, including geology, chemistry, physics, and biology, 
commonly play a role in today’s courts.  Criminal trials relying on 
forensic evidence, claims brought under the Endangered Species Act, 
toxic tort litigation, hazardous waste cleanup disputes, and other 
proceedings almost always involve expert testimony from at least one 
scientific discipline. 
In addition to its increasing prevalence in the courtroom, scientific 
testimony is special because it often concerns complex theories and 
matters unfamiliar to the finder of fact.  All experts called to testify 
are better acquainted with the subject matter of their testimony than 
the average person, and the theories underlying scientific testimony 
are frequently abstract, difficult to ground in common knowledge, and 
not easily relatable to everyday experiences.  Judges, and certainly 
juries selected at random from the general population, cannot be 
 
10 As this section illuminates, certain characteristics of scientific expert testimony, 
including the public’s perception of “scientific evidence,” distinguish it from other types 
of evidence and testimony.  Because of this, judges and rule-makers should pay special 
attention to such evidence when presented in their courtrooms or when drafting pertinent 
rules.  In particular, it is important that judges and rule-makers consider how juries are 
likely to perceive such evidence, the weight they assign to it, and how this might influence 
their fact-finding abilities. 
11 Hon. Geoffrey L. Davies, The Changing Face of Litigation, 6 J. JUD. ADMIN. 179, 
188 (1997); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (specifically noting that “science-related issues have increased in number”). 
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expected to have specialized knowledge or schooling in a scientific 
area in order to be fit to hear the case.  Yet judges and juries alike are 
called upon to evaluate expert testimony and often to determine which 
of two competing views is “correct.”  As one Australian judge 
summarized: 
[T]he difficulty of a trier of fact, whether judge or jury, in 
understanding and consequently in assessing the reliability of such 
evidence, though not a new problem, has now become a critical one. 
. . . [T]here is now a good deal of [scientific and technical] evidence 
that is quite beyond the capacity of most judges to understand.  And 
in many cases in which a judge has some capacity to understand the 
evidence he or she will lack the capacity to decide between 
competing opinions.  Nevertheless, here and elsewhere, judges 
continue to decide such questions on the apparent assumption that 
they have the capacity to do so.12 
In American civil and criminal trials, the fact-finding role is often 
filled by jurors rather than judges, further complicating considerations 
of how to best aid the finder of fact in the evaluation of competing 
scientific evidence. 
Additionally, scientific evidence requires special consideration due 
to the high degree of reliability often accredited to scientific data and 
results.  People frequently and mistakenly assume that scientific 
findings are objective determinations of “truth” and that scientists, 
armed with the rigorous and objective scientific method, report only 
true, objective “facts.”  However, classifying scientific findings as the 
manifestation of purely objective methods is an idealization of a field 
that is heavily influenced by funding sources, political climate, 
cultural norms, and the subjective interpretations of laboratory 
scientists.13  In other words, “[t]he ‘facts’ that scientists discover 
about physical and social phenomena . . . are not pure, unmediated 
renditions of an external reality whose objectivity is secured by a 
single, transcendent scientific method.”14  Despite the effects of these 
outside influences, scientific findings still enjoy the overall perception 
of objective “truth” in our society.15  These common misconceptions 
surrounding scientific results risk clouding the minds of fact finders in 
the courtroom, as “jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree 
 
12 Davies, supra note 11, at 188. 
13 See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in 
Law, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 272–73, 277 (2002). 
14 Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S49, S54 (Supp. 2005). 
15 See, e.g., id. at S49. 
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of certainty to proof derived from an apparently ‘scientific’ 
mechanism, instrument, or procedure.”16 
Fact finders may also fail to recognize that, because scientific 
conclusions are not completely objective, more than one supportable 
conclusion may be drawn from a single scenario.  When two experts 
testify to two different conclusions based on the same evidence, the 
finder of fact may jump to the conclusion that only one finding is 
correct, and the other must be “junk science,” while forgetting the 
possibility that both may coexist or the possibility that neither can be 
proven true with absolute certainty.17  It is important for the finder of 
fact to understand why scientific testimonies might vary when 
determining which experts’ interpretation is most appropriate for 
evaluating a given case.  Likewise, identifying common reasons why 
scientific conclusions may vary is essential to evaluating possible 
techniques to mitigate the problems of dueling experts. 
There are several reasons why two scientific experts might reach 
and testify to two different conclusions from the same scenario.  First, 
and arguably most concerning to the judicial system, is the possibility 
that one expert’s testimony relies on “junk science”—science that is 
either not accepted in the community, based on ill-founded principles, 
idiosyncratic, or otherwise defiant of conventional scientific 
wisdom.18  The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility 
 
16 People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984); see also David E. Bernstein, 
Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 
93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 455 (2008) (“[J]urors may be particularly likely to assume that an 
expert witness, particularly a scientist, is an unbiased participant in the proceedings.”). 
 Even if the scientific method existed and functioned in an ideal, unadulterated form, it 
would still lack the ability to prove conclusions with absolute certainty.  At its most 
fundamental level, science is based on formulating, rejecting, and modifying hypotheses in 
accordance with empirical evidence gathered through observation and experimentation.  
While increased support may eventually elevate the status of a hypothesis to that of a well-
tested, universally accepted theory, a hypothesis can never be proven with absolute 
certainty.  Instead, theories and hypotheses are always subject to falsification by further 
empirical evidence.  Thus, even in cases where neither party disputes scientific 
conclusions drawn from the relevant facts and evidence, it is important to remember that 
science lacks the ability to provide a definite assurance of truth. 
17 See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific 
Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. 
REV. 341, 353 (2003); Jasanoff, supra note 14, at S54 (“[T]he existence of controversy 
does not mean in and of itself that one or the other side has adopted an ‘unscientific’ 
method or is propagating ‘junk science’; it could simply mean that uncertainties are 
unresolvable in the present state of knowledge.”). 
18 Thomas G. Gutheil & Harold J. Bursztajn, Attorney Abuses of Daubert Hearings: 
Junk Science, Junk Law, or Just Plain Obstruction?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
150, 150 (2005). 
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of scientific evidence in federal court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which positioned the judge as an evidentiary 
gatekeeper charged with the task of keeping junk science out of the 
courtroom.19  Under Daubert, either party may make a pretrial motion 
challenging a party’s scientific or expert testimony.20  Such a 
challenge results in a formal evaluation and judicial determination of 
the admissibility of the expert testimony based upon the evidence’s 
reliability.21  By applying various factors set out by the Daubert 
Court, the judge assesses the merits of the evidence with the aim of 
excluding junk science from the courtroom.22 
While the possibility of junk science squeezing into the post-
Daubert courtroom may still be cause for concern, dueling scientific 
testimony arising from more nuanced conflicts often presents a 
greater challenge for the finder of fact.  In these circumstances, it is 
more difficult to ferret out, through standard witness direct and cross-
examination, precisely where the two conflicting opinions differ and 
the cause of that difference.  Further determining which testimony is 
closer to the “truth,” or most appropriate for a given set of facts, is 
even more challenging. 
Two experts, neither of whom relies on junk science, might 
disagree because they adhere to two different schools of thought, both 
of which are supportable.  Two psychiatrists, for instance, would 
likely draw different conclusions upon examining the same patient if 
one relied on Freudian and the other on non-Freudian psychiatry.23  
Though they may be at odds with each other, both opinions could 
draw sufficient support from their respective schools of thought.  
Experts might also disagree due to unresolved controversies within 
their discipline.  Whether social isolation is a risk factor for heart 
disease, for instance, represents a controversy that has not been fully 
 
19 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  Two subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases join Daubert 
to form the “Daubert Trilogy.”  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court established 
abuse of discretion as the standard of review for appellate courts reviewing trial courts’ 
determinations of admissibility of expert testimony.  522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).  In Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court held that trial court judges serve as the gatekeepers for 
all expert testimony, including nonscientific expert testimony.  526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
20 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
21 Id. at 592–93. 
22 The Daubert factors include: whether the technique or theory can be, and has been, 
tested; whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted; and the technique’s or 
theory’s known or potential rate of error.  Id. at 593–94. 
23 Downes, supra note 6, at 187. 
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resolved within the medical profession and could lead to a difference 
in expert opinions in a medical dispute.24  These types of 
controversies frequently involve issues of new hypotheses that have 
some support but have not been fully investigated, perhaps because a 
conclusive way to test various postulates has yet to be developed. 
Scientific conclusions may also differ based on assumptions made 
throughout the process of analyzing the same scenario.  For example, 
two experts may hold different opinions regarding the most 
appropriate way to take a measurement, make an observation, or 
apply a body of knowledge to certain criteria.25  Field biologists, for 
instance, who employ different methods of counting individual 
animals of a certain species, may collect disparate data for use in 
population calculations, leading to two distinct, but supportable, 
conclusions.  Similarly, experts frequently disagree on what 
constitutes “good data” that ought to be included in their calculations 
rather than excluded due to methodological flaws.26  Each expert 
could give legitimate reasons why the assumptions that led them to 
their choice of counting methods or data selection are valid and 
preferable. Each expert may even acknowledge the validity in the 
other expert’s methodology.  In these situations, the court is left with 
two supportable views, neither of which is “junk.”  When considering 
possible ways to address issues of dueling scientific experts, it is 
important to acknowledge both why two experts might disagree and 
that both testimonies may be founded on legitimate and supportable 
reasoning. 
II 
BIAS IN EXPERT TESTIMONY 
In addition to difficulties arising from plausible, but conflicting, 
opinions and the complex nature of scientific testimony, evaluating 
adversarial expert testimony is further complicated by expert bias.  
Understanding the origins of bias associated with partisan expert 
testimony is important when considering possible solutions to this 
longstanding problem.  The most blatant forms of adversarial expert 
bias stem from the reality that experts are paid for their testimony.27  
Because of the business relationship between an expert and one party 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1024. 
27 Id. at 1010. 
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to a case, experts are overwhelmingly viewed as “hired guns” who 
“adapt their opinions to the needs of the attorney who hires them.”28  
Michigan Law Professor Samuel Gross spoke straight to the heart of 
this problem by stating “[e]xperts in other fields see lawyers as 
unprincipled manipulators of their disciplines, and lawyers and 
experts alike see expert witnesses—those members of other learned 
professions who will consort with lawyers—as whores.”29  While this 
characterization is likely inappropriately harsh for the majority of 
expert witnesses, other, more subtle forms of bias generated by parties 
hiring their own experts may affect the objectivity of expert 
testimony.30 
Bias arising from the exchange of testimony for cash can be broken 
down into several categories, which may or may not contribute to a 
particular expert’s ability to offer objective testimony.  First, and most 
troubling, certain “unscrupulous experts will literally offer themselves 
for hire, selling their opinions and their credentials to anyone who 
meets their price.”31  Once hired, these professionals use their 
credentials to back their testimony, whether or not it is based on 
sound analysis or credible theories.  This behavior echoes Gross’s 
depiction of experts as prostitutes, willing to testify to anything for 
the right price. 
Even where this is not the case and experts genuinely resist 
behavior that might land them in this class of “whores,” unconscious 
bias may still affect an expert’s objectivity.  Working closely with 
only one party makes witnesses susceptible to developing a natural 
bias for that side of the case, which can threaten their ability to testify 
objectively.32  While more subtle and less amoral than testifying to 
just about anything given the right price, this type of bias still causes 
experts to slant their testimony in favor of the party who signs their 
paycheck.33 
Although it may seem logical that experts ought to be chosen by 
their reputation and experience in their field of specialty, in reality 
 
28 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 454–55. 
29 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1991). 
30 While this critique is especially blunt, it conforms to the general consensus that hired 
experts often do not present objective views from their fields of expertise, instead 
matching their opinions to the needs of those who pay them.  E.g., Bernstein, supra note 
16, at 454–55; Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1010–11; see also Gross, supra note 29, at 1115. 
31 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1011. 
32 Id. at 1010–11. 
33 Id. at 1011. 
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expertise is secondary to whether the expert’s views match the needs 
of the hiring attorney.  Attorneys tend to shop for experts based on the 
specific opinions they will, or can, be paid to offer in court.34  Some 
attorneys may encounter ten, twenty, fifty, or more experts who hold 
views disparate to the opinion desired before finding one whose 
opinion aligns with their needs and is willing to testify.  This does not 
render a “‘fair professional opinion’ from each party’s experts, but 
‘an exceptional opinion’ from each side.”35  Known as selection bias, 
this particular type of bias means “experts retained by a party will not 
represent a random sampling of expert opinions.”36  Instead, it is 
likely that at least one, if not both sides, will present expert opinions 
that lie toward the far extremes of the spectrum of views held 
throughout the field.  Thus, even though the court will benefit from 
hearing multiple points of view, it might only hear viewpoints on the 
fringes of the discipline and not the predominate view of the field.  
The prevalence of selection bias indicates that attorneys “often have a 
sufficient number of available expert witnesses to allow them to select 
one that will best represent a client’s partisan interests.”37  
Furthermore, selection and conscious bias eliminate the traditional 
relationship between price and quality, as price is not based on the 
prestige of an expert’s scholastic or professional credentials, but 
rather the specific opinions experts are willing to furnish.38 
Significant weight is also placed on an expert’s comfort and ability 
to adapt to the courtroom setting.  Scientists who do not testify in 
court regularly, for instance, are generally unaccustomed to 
presenting their findings in such an adversarial setting.  An expert 
with less impressive credentials who is at ease on the stand tends to 
be favored over a highly respected expert whose uneasiness or 
unfamiliarity with the judicial process compromises the expert’s 
ability to deliver convincing testimony.39  Attorneys are thus further 
 
34 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 29, at 1129–33. 
35 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 456 (quoting Lord Abinger v. Ashton, 17 L.R.Eq. 358, 
374 (Ch. 1873)). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 455 n.16 (quoting BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN 
COURT: RECONCILING LAW, SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 6 (2005)); see 
also Gross, supra note 29, at 1129–30. 
38 See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1011–12. 
39 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 29, at 1133 (“Attorneys . . . shop around for those experts 
with the best testimonial manner and the most appealing credentials, and they avoid those 
experts (however knowledgeable) who look bad, speak poorly, or have insufficiently 
impressive diplomas.”). 
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incentivized to hire experts based not on their qualifications as a 
scientist or reputation in their field of expertise, but rather on their 
comfort on the stand and ability to adapt to courtroom procedures. 
The market for expert testimony has allowed some experts to 
transition the bulk of their work from within their field of specialty to 
the witness stand.40  Experts who make this transformation to 
professional witnesses have an incentive to maintain a favorable 
reputation among potential employers within the legal community.  
This “strong interest in maintaining . . . marketability by being a 
‘team player’” has led to a “marketplace for experts [that cannot] be 
trusted to produce reliable information.”41  Basically, in addition to 
slanting an opinion for the benefit of one employer and the particular 
case at hand, professional witnesses have an interest in providing 
testimony that will help them build a profitable reputation.  Selection 
bias, conscious and unconscious bias, and professional self-interest 
pose significant threats to obtaining justice in cases requiring expert 
testimony.  While an expert’s duty officially lies with the court, the 
adversarial setting compromises the likelihood of experts testifying 
objectively.42 
Despite all the problems that accompany partisan expert testimony, 
American courts continue to rely on this system, leaving the task of 
sorting through the opposing testimony to judges and juries as they 
strive to arrive at a just conclusion.  The obvious difficulty is that 
most judges, and certainly most jurors, do not have the expertise to 
evaluate expert testimony on its merits and must rely on secondary 
factors.  Irish Justice Philip O’Sullivan described the frustration of 
evaluating two coherent, but contradicting, expert testimonies as a 
situation with “no easy or obvious solution” that left him “feeling like 
an intellectual pygmy looking up at two giants [unable,] from that 
vantage point[, to] tell which of them [was] taller.”43  In these 
situations, where the fact finder lacks the requisite knowledge to 
evaluate expert testimony based on its actual content, judges and 
juries are left to evaluate competing testimony based on secondary 
indicia of expertise.44  Thus, factors like an expert’s charisma, 
confidence, curriculum vitae, and ability to explain material without 
 
40 See, e.g., id. at 1131; Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1011–12. 
41 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1012. 
42 Bernstein, supra note 16, at 454 n.13. 
43 Hon. Philip O’Sullivan, A Hot Tub for Expert Witnesses, 4 JUD. STUD. INST. J. 1, 2 
(2004). 
44 Mnookin, supra note 1, at 1012–13. 
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sounding condescending become much more important.  While these 
proxies are often inadequate or difficult to evaluate, the fact finder 
frequently has no choice but to rely on them when differentiating 
between opposing testimony.45 
The United States is not the only nation that relies upon adversarial 
expert testimony.  Consequently, the problems arising from this 
method are not unique to the American court system.46  For example, 
Lord Woolf of England echoed concerns over hired experts, 
reporting: 
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts.  Men of 
outstanding eminence in their field.  Today they are in practice 
hired guns.  There is a new breed of litigation hangers-on, whose 
main expertise is to craft reports which will conceal anything that 
might be to the disadvantage of their clients.47 
Likewise, Australian attorneys frequently call their own hired experts 
to the stand, and the Australian court system continues to fight the 
ongoing battle of biased experts.48  Because the difficulties posed by 
adversarial expert testimony in America are substantially similar to 
those found in foreign courts employing similar systems, foreign 
tactics to squelch these problems are of significant interest.  While 
procedural and evidentiary rules vary between nations, it is worth 
considering innovative solutions proposed by foreign jurisdictions, as 
some may be adapted to suit American courts. 
 
45 Id. at 1014. 
46 America’s approach to expert witnesses, however, is not followed by the majority of 
foreign judiciaries where “expert witnesses are selected by judges and are meant to be 
neutral and independent.”  Adam Liptak, Experts Hired to Shed Light Can Leave U.S. 
Courts in Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1; see also John H. Langbein, The 
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985) (“The 
European jurist who visits the United States and becomes acquainted with our civil 
procedure typically expresses amazement at our witness practice.  His amazement turns to 
something bordering on disbelief when he discovers that we extend the sphere of partisan 
control to the selection and preparation of experts.  In the Continental tradition experts are 
selected and commissioned by the court, although with great attention to safeguarding 
party interests.”). 
47 Downes, supra note 6, at 185 (quoting LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES 183 (1995)). 
48 See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra note 8, at 54. 
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III 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Concerns over partisan expert testimony have prompted the 
formulation of many alternatives to adversarial expert testimony, each 
with its own proclaimed advantages.49  None, however, have 
successfully replaced the adversarial expert system in American 
courts. 
The court-appointed expert is perhaps the most frequently 
suggested solution as it eliminates dueling experts altogether by 
limiting expert testimony to a single opinion.  The appointment of the 
single expert may involve the parties’ approval, or the court may 
appoint the expert without the consent of the parties to the suit.50  
While the court-appointed expert prevents disagreement between 
experts on the stand, it gives rise to a new set of concerns involving 
the adequacy of expert testimony.51 
Beyond the inconvenience of deviating from a long-implemented 
procedure, disadvantages of other potential methods of eliminating 
multiple expert opinions are prohibitive to change.52  Reducing the 
number of experts from those provided by each side of a suit to a 
single advising expert is particularly worrisome where scientific 
testimony is concerned.53  As discussed above, there are various 
reasons why scientific experts might draw differing conclusions.54  
Different, legitimate conclusions are intrinsic to scientific research 
and development and drawing from only one source, regardless of 
how well respected, limits evidence to one of possibly many 
supportable scientific viewpoints.  Australian Justice Gary Downes 
summarized this shortcoming of single expert testimony by stating: 
“The fallacy underlying the one-expert argument lies in the unstated 
[premise] that in fields of expert knowledge there is only one 
 
49 See, e.g., Downes, supra note 6, at 185. 
50 E.g., id. 
51 See, e.g., id. 
52 Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1583 (2007) 
(explaining that, while there may be benefits to moving away from party control over 
expert testimony, the tradition of adversarial expert testimony will likely be difficult to 
overturn).  “One cannot ignore . . . the entrenched nature of current arrangements.  
Whatever the merits of substantial reforms such as the greater use of court-appointed 
experts, they seem unlikely to occur in the short run.”  Id. 
53 See Downes, supra note 6, at 186–87. 
54 See supra text accompanying notes 17–26. 
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answer.”55  While single expert testimony will increase efficiency and 
make the job of the finder of fact easier, it provides “no way [to test] 
whether the [expert’s] conclusions are correct[, as] there is nothing to 
test the expert evidence against.”56  There is no method to counter the 
testimony presented with another possible conclusion that might 
either shine light on the subjectivity underlying the testimony or 
explain new developments that may be well grounded in scientific 
reasoning—but not yet accepted widely or by the testifying expert. 
Adversarial expert testimony, on the other hand, introduces 
multiple viewpoints and avoids the problems of hearing only one, of 
possibly many, respected perspectives.  Though far from perfect, 
adversarial expert testimony has significant advantages over single-
expert methods, particularly in fields where well-respected experts 
frequently draw different conclusions. 
IV 
AUSTRALIA’S HOT TUB METHOD 
One possible solution that preserves the benefits of hearing 
multiple scientific viewpoints, while also combating the alarming 
problems of “hired guns” and other challenges typically associated 
with adversarial experts and complex scientific evidence, has been 
developed in Australian courts over the last decade.57  Hot tubbing, 
more formally known as concurrent evidence, involves experts from 
each side engaging, under oath, in a conversation with each other, the 
judge, and counsel from both sides of the case.58  This relatively 
informal technique is praised for reducing, and even eliminating, 
some of the problems of traditional methods of adversarial expert 
testimony, while continuing to allow each side to select and present 
their own witnesses.  While the images invoked by its namesake are 
undoubtedly more entertaining than the actual procedure, this new 
way of conducting “dull legal events” has proven effective at 
 
55 Downes, supra note 6, at 186. 
56 Id. at 187. 
57 When considering this procedural innovation, it is important to note that Australian 
federal courts do not utilize juries or hear criminal trials.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 127–28.  The implications of these differences and possible methods to adapt for 
such differences are detailed later in this Comment.  See infra Parts VII–VIII. 
58 See infra text accompanying notes 60–68. 
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resolving some of the problems that typically accompany expert 
evidence.59 
While there are many slight variations in methodology, former 
Australian Justice Peter Heerey’s description of the hot tub outlines 
the basics of the procedure: 
The procedure involves the parties’ experts giving evidence in the 
presence of each other after all the lay evidence on both sides has 
been given.  The experts are sworn in and sit in the witness box or a 
suitably large table which is treated notionally as the witness      
box. . . . A day or so previously, each expert will have filed a brief 
summary of his or her position in the light of all the evidence so far.  
In the box the plaintiff’s expert will give a brief oral exposition, 
typically for ten minutes or so.  Then the defendant’s expert will ask 
the plaintiff’s expert questions, that is to say directly, without the 
intervention of counsel.  Then the process is reversed.  In effect a 
brief colloquium takes place.  Finally each expert gives a brief 
summary.  When all this is completed, counsel cross-examine and 
re-examine in the conventional way.60 
Thus, experts and counsel are able to discuss conflicting expert 
testimony, hear from each side contemporaneously, and have the 
opportunity to defend, clarify, and distinguish their own evidence in 
the course of questioning their colleagues.  Generally, the presiding 
judge may also ask questions at any time throughout the procedure.61  
In other variations, each expert’s “brief oral exposition [may be] 
omitted,”62 the number of experts participating in the hot tub 
procedure may vary, or the experts may even meet or exchange 
written reports before trial concerning their views on the pertinent 
issues.63 
 
59 Though its name may suggest otherwise, hot tubbing does not involve bathing suits 
and warm water baths in the courtroom.  Experts do not climb into bubbling hot tubs 
perhaps, as former Australian Justice Peter Heerey suggests, because “[c]onstraints of 
propriety and court design dictate a less exciting solution.”  Heerey, supra note 8, at 390.  
The “irreverent soubriquet,” id., of “hot tub” may have been chosen over more descriptive, 
albeit less provocative, labels such as concurrent expert evidence as a way to “stimulate 
interest at otherwise dull legal events.”  Paul Stockton, Comment: Some Lessons from 
Australia, ADJUST NEWSL. (Council on Tribunals, London, U.K.), July 2006, ¶ 12, 
available at http://www.council-on-tribunals.gov.uk/adjust/item/comment_australia.htm. 
60 Heerey, supra note 8, at 390–91. 
61 RITA FARRELL, ‘HOT TUBBING’ ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE IN NATIVE TITLE 
MEDIATIONS 4 (Nat’l Native Title Tribunal 2007), available at http://nntt.gov.au/ 
Publications-And-Research/Tribunal-Research/Documents/Hot%20tubbing.pdf. 
62 Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
63 See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra note 8, at 56–57; FARRELL, supra note 61, at 4.  
Exchange of expert reports may be very helpful in jurisdictions that require identification 
of experts before trial.  Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
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The Australian judiciary developed hot tubbing as part of an effort 
to overcome the difficulties associated with adversarial expert 
testimony.64  The procedure appears to have its roots in the Trade 
Practices Tribunal of Australia, where it was suggested by counsel 
and adopted by Justice Lockhart,65 a “much revered” judge in the 
Australian Federal Court.66  Hot tubs were formally incorporated into 
some Australian courts by an amendment to the Federal Court Rules 
in 1998, and other Australian courts introduced similar procedures as 
well.67  Hot tubs are now used in a variety of cases in several courts 
and tribunals of Australia as well as in Canadian administrative 
competition proceedings and some international administrative 
procedures.68 
A.  Benefits of Hot Tubbing 
Several key benefits are ascribed to hot tubbing.  First, the hot tub 
is a tool used to focus expert testimony to the actual issue in 
 
parties disclose the identity of expert witnesses they may use in trial.  Unlike in federal 
court, however, there is no requirement in Oregon courts for parties to disclose the identity 
of their experts until they take the stand.  See, e.g., Symposium, Panel Two, 24 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 291–92 (2008) (“[I]n Oregon the only time you learn about expert 
testimony is when the judge looks down at the other side and says, ‘Call your next 
expert—next witness.’ . . . It’s trial by ambush there.  But nearly everywhere else you’re 
going to have a chance to get into the details of the expert’s testimony, and the other side, 
of course, will get a chance to get into the details of your expert, which is a good thing.  
I’m against trial-by-ambush as much fun as it is.”).  Thus, hot tub activities requiring the 
identities of experts to be revealed before they are called to the stand could not be 
compelled in jurisdictions such as Oregon.  Parties may, however, voluntarily reveal their 
experts if they are convinced of the benefits of such pretrial hot tubbing activities. 
 The term “hot tubbing” is sometimes used to describe a pretrial or out-of-court 
conference of experts rather than the concurrent collection of evidence in court described 
above.  FARRELL, supra note 61, at 5.  The in-court concurrent method, however, is the 
meaning most commonly associated with the term “hot tub” and will be the designated 
meaning of “hot tubbing” for the purposes of this Comment. 
64 Hon. Garry Downes, President, Admin. Appeals Tribunal, Concurrent Expert 
Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: The New South Wales Experience 3 
(Feb. 27, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Australasian Conference of Planning 
and Environment Courts and Tribunals in Hobart), available at http://www.aat.gov.au/ 
SpeechesPapersAndResearch/speeches/downes/pdf/concurrent.pdf. 
65 Heerey, supra note 8, at 390. 
66 Geoffrey L. Davies, Recent Australian Developments: A Response to Peter Heerey, 
23 CIV. JUST. Q. 396, 397 (2004).  Justice Lockhart adopted the procedure in 1976.  Id. 
67 ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL (Austl.), AN EVALUATION OF THE USE OF CONCURRENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL 7–9 (2005), available at 
http://www.aat.gov.au/SpeechesPapersAndResearch/Research/AATConcurrentEvidenceR
eportNovember2005.pdf; Downes, supra note 64, at 3. 
68 Lisa C. Wood, Experts in the Tub, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 95, 95. 
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dispute.69  As stated by former Justice Heerey, the hot tub method 
allows experts to testify “when the critical issues have been refined 
and the area of real dispute narrowed to the bare minimum.”70  Under 
traditional methods, identifying the points opposing experts actually 
agree and disagree to may be confusing.  By narrowing expert 
testimony and stripping away peripheral areas of agreement, the 
actual issue in dispute is less likely to be clouded by superfluous 
technical or scientific testimony. 
Second, the hot tub method allows experts testifying on the same 
subject to do so contemporaneously.  This can aid the finder of fact 
significantly, especially in trials where experts’ testimony might 
otherwise be separated by a period of days or even weeks.71  Hearing 
the testimony of opposing experts contemporaneously allows the 
finder of fact to avoid having “to compare a witness giving evidence 
now with the half-remembered evidence of another expert given 
perhaps some weeks previously.”72  Contemporaneous testimony also 
confines modifications or qualifications of testimony that may 
otherwise occur after an expert takes the stand to a single, discrete 
time period.  This helps the fact finder apprehend the contents and 
implications of a particular expert’s testimony, including the 
assumptions behind the evidence that “may [be] destroyed or 
substantially qualified” before the next expert takes the stand.73 
Even in cases where experts are able to testify consecutively 
without a period of days separating their appearances, having multiple 
experts testify at once avoids the problem of having to later recall 
each expert to the stand to clarify their opinion or rebut an opposing 
expert.  Thus, covering all expert testimony at one time both prevents 
time lapses from clouding fact finders’ memories and avoids the 
hassle of recalling experts every time they would like to refute or 
qualify statements made by opposing experts.74 
 
69 See, e.g., Cheeseman, supra note 8, at 55; Heerey, supra note 8, at 391; Stockton, 
supra note 59, ¶ 14; Wood, supra note 68, at 96. 
70 Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
71 ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 9. 
72 Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
73 See id. 
74 See, e.g., Downes, supra note 64, at 4 (“[I]n contrast to the conventional approach, 
where an interval of up to several weeks may separate the experts’ testimony, the panel 
approach enables the judge to compare and consider the competing opinions on a fair 
basis.” (quoting the Australian Federal Court)); Stockton, supra note 59, ¶¶ 13–14; Wood, 
supra note 68, at 96. 
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A third benefit of the hot tub is the physical placement of the 
experts.  Placing experts at one table, or in the same witness box, both 
downplays the adversarial relationship between the experts imposed 
by the litigation75 and emphasizes the “proper role” of the experts: to 
provide their unbiased expert opinion on the issue at hand.76  As the 
Australian Federal Court noted: “There is . . . symbolic and practical 
importance in removing the experts from their position in the camp of 
the party who called them.”77  Reducing the adversarial nature of 
expert examination also “‘release[s] the tension which normally 
infects the evidence gathering process’” and helps experts relax and 
focus on the substance of their testimony.78  The conversational 
atmosphere of the hot tub is more familiar to most scientists than 
traditional examination and cross-examination methods, and the 
colloquial nature of the process bears closer resemblance to the 
discussions and debates they might have with their colleagues outside 
of the courtroom.79  This helps facilitate discussion, allowing experts 
who are otherwise uncomfortable in the adversarial courtroom setting 
to relax and contribute more fully.80  It also reduces the risk of one 
expert’s opinion appearing dominant solely because the expert is 
more at ease on the stand.  This leveling effect is especially beneficial 
in cases where the complexity of the subject leaves the fact finder to 
rely on secondary factors immaterial to the validity of the science 
supporting the testimony when determining which opinion is most 
persuasive.  Hearing the experts engage in a conversation with each 
other may also help judges and juries make this determination and is 
arguably more probative than other secondary factors used to decide 
which testimony is most credible.81 
As mentioned above, the hot tub method is favored by experts over 
traditional procedures.82  Evidence suggests that experts prefer the 
 
75 See Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
76 Stockton, supra note 59, ¶ 15; see also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 16, at 454 n.13. 
77 AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 89, MANAGING JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM § 6.117 (2000), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/ 
au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/ch6.html. 
78 Wood, supra note 68, at 96 (quoting Australian Judge Peter McClellan) (alteration in 
original). 
79 See, e.g., Marvin J. Garbis, Aussie Inspired Musings on Technological Issues—Of 
Kangaroo Courts, Tutorials & Hot Tub Cross-Examination, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 144 
(2003). 
80 Wood, supra note 68, at 96. 
81 See id. 
82 E.g., ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 8; Stockton, supra note 59, ¶ 15. 
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conversational nature of the hot tub over traditional witness 
examination methods because it “[fits] in much better with the way in 
which they normally [work].”83  Hot tubbing moves the process 
“somewhat away from lawyers interrogating experts towards a 
structured professional discussion between peers in the relevant 
field.”84  Not surprisingly, experts feel that this forum allows them to 
better express their opinions than when they are constrained by the 
traditional method of examination and cross-examination, where they 
can only answer questions directly posed to them by an attorney.85  
Experts also feel that this allows them to “respond more effectively to 
the views of the other experts.”86  Furthermore, some experts who 
have testified in the hot tub “feel that there is less risk that their 
evidence will be distorted by the skill of the advocate.”87  Overall, the 
“brief colloquium” of the hot tub is a closer match to the standard 
dialogue of experts than the traditional adversarial approach, which 
often seems “entirely alien to [experts].”88 
In addition to improving experts’ ability to express their opinions 
accurately, expert witnesses would seem to prefer the hot tub method 
because their professional organizations would likely support the 
procedural change.89  In a world where experts who testify in court 
are often seen as “whores” who mold their opinions to suit the needs 
of the lawsuit, any procedural modification allowing them to express 
their views in a more favorable way to their profession in general is a 
welcomed change.90 
Finally, the hot tub method is praised for increasing judicial 
economy.91  While it is difficult to calculate exact monetary and time 
savings, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court reported 
that hot tubbing takes as little as half, or even twenty percent, of the 
time required by traditional methods.92  The method is especially 
 
83 Stockton, supra note 59, ¶ 15. 
84 N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 109: EXPERT WITNESSES § 6.56 (2005), 
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/pages/LRC_r109chp06. 
85 See, e.g., ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 8–9. 
86 Id. at 8. 
87 Id. 
88 Stockton, supra note 59, ¶ 15. 
89 See Gross, supra note 29, at 1115. 
90 See id. (referring to the common perception of expert witnesses as whores). 
91 E.g., Heerey, supra note 8, at 391; Stockton, supra note 59, ¶ 15; Wood, supra note 
68, at 96. 
92 ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 8. 
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efficient when more than two experts are involved in the procedure.93  
In one Australian case involving a large number of parties and many 
experts testifying about geographic indices in viniculture, the initial 
estimated hearing time of six months was reduced to an actual hearing 
time of only five weeks through the use of the hot tub procedure.94 
In November 2005, the Australian Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal conducted a study examining the use of concurrent evidence 
in hearings in the New South Wales Registry.95  The study gathered 
quantitative and qualitative data through surveys, file audits, and 
focus groups in order to examine the general effectiveness of hot tubs 
in real hearings.96  This study went beyond listing hypothetical 
benefits of hot tubbing by providing actual data supporting many of 
the benefits outlined above.97 
B.  Shortcomings of the Hot Tub Method 
While hot tubbing enjoys significant support in Australian federal 
courts and has many ascribed benefits, it does not enjoy universal 
popularity.  Some argue that, regardless of whether the hot tub or 
traditional methods are used, experts will be heavily prepped by the 
attorney and equally susceptible to bias.98  Justice Geoffery L. Davies 
of the Queensland Court of Appeal argues that “expert[s come] to the 
[h]ot [t]ub armed not merely as . . . expert witness[es] but as . . . 
expert advocate[s].”99  Davies argues that, as a result, hot tubbing will 
not expose adversarial bias and will leave the finder of fact either with 
“two opposed but apparently convincing opinions by equally well-
qualified experts, neither of them . . . shaken in the process . . . [or] 
unwittingly convinced by the more articulate and apparently 
authoritative personality.”100  At worst, this depiction leaves the court 
in essentially the same position as traditional methods, with the 
testimony of biased experts controlled by each side’s advocate and 
 
93 N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 84, § 6.56. 
94 Downes, supra note 64, at 5. 
95 ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 4. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 4–5; see infra text accompanying notes 110–19 (describing the results of the 
study). 
98 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 66, at 398. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 398–99. 
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either a deadlock of disagreement or a choice based on secondary 
criteria rather than the validity of the experts’ views. 
Critics further argue that without a skilled moderator or judge 
willing to facilitate the hot tub, the informative discussions between 
professional colleagues tend to degrade into “unproductive 
squabbles.”101  Furthermore, one expert stated that he has observed 
“hot tubs where neither expert had questions for the other and the 
court did not choose to intervene to save the situation.”102  Although 
both of these problems are serious concerns, they are easily avoidable 
if judges are familiar with the procedure and willing to prepare before 
facilitating a hot tub in their court.  In the unlikely event that neither 
expert has questions for the other, counsel may still proceed with 
standard direct and cross-examinations of each expert witness.  In this 
scenario, the court would still benefit from some of the other 
advantages of hot tubbing, including contemporaneous examination 
of experts in the same room.  If conversation between experts truly 
degenerates to “squabbles,” a judge can easily step in and move the 
procedure along to the standard direct and cross-examination phase. 
While advocates of the hot tub technique tout the procedure’s 
efficiency, Davies disagrees and believes that the hot tub method 
seems “too cumbersome [and] too expensive.”103  Though efficiency 
is difficult to evaluate when only one method or the other can be 
utilized in any single instance, most accounts conclude that, in 
general, hot tubbing results in a net increase of efficiency.104  Despite 
Davies’s critique, hot tubbing has spread “to simpler cases for which 
the technique was not initially designed, principally for reasons of 
efficiency.”105  Careful selection of cases that can benefit from hot 
tubbing can also help eliminate the chance of the procedure reducing 
economic and judicial efficiency. 
While critics of hot tubbing point to certain weaknesses, it seems 
unlikely that the court would suffer a net loss of efficiency or be put 
in a worse position by using the hot tub rather than traditional 
methods, even in situations where the procedure’s weaknesses would 
have the greatest impact.  Overall, hot tubbing enjoys more supporters 
 
101 Lisa C. Wood, Experts Only: Out of the Hot Tub and into the Joint Conference, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 89, 92. 
102 Id. 
103 Davies, supra note 66, at 399. 
104 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 68, at 96. 
105 Id. 
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than it suffers critics in Australia,106 which strengthens the conclusion 
that, though imperfect, the method’s advantages outweigh its flaws. 
V 
WHEN IS THE HOT TUB PROCEDURE APPROPRIATE? 
In Australia, hot tubbing has been implemented in the federal 
courts as well as the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and the Australian Competition 
Tribunal.107  While rules of evidence and procedure governing these 
courts and tribunals vary, factors considered in determining whether 
the hot tub should be used for a particular case appear substantially 
similar across jurisdictions.108 
The hot tub method has been used in Australia to facilitate expert 
testimony in many different fields, ranging from doctors testifying 
about various medical specialties, animal behavior specialists, 
accounting witnesses, viniculturists, and beyond.109  While certain 
types of cases require expert testimony more frequently than others, 
the particular field of expertise does not play a major role in 
determining whether a hot tub is appropriate.  As a result, no field of 
expertise has been labeled more hot tub appropriate than others, and 
any area of testimony prone to dueling experts is a candidate for hot 
tubbing procedures.  Other important factors to consider may present 
themselves more frequently in certain disciplines, making hot tubbing 
more common in those disciplines than others, but no such correlation 
has been reported.  In one Australian study examining the 
effectiveness of medical experts in the hot tub, presentation of 
psychiatric evidence in the tub received less favorable reviews than 
other areas of medical testimony.110  This was due, at least in part, to 
the fact that the “medical theory [was] not as black and white” as 
other areas of medicine.111  This data both highlights difficulties that 
arise when experts reach different conclusions because theories are 
not “black and white” and is a source of difficulty regardless of 
whether expert testimony is given via traditional methods or in the hot 
 
106 Id. 
107 E.g., ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 7, 9. 
108 See, e.g., id. at 8 n.11. 
109 See, e.g., ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 10–11, 27; Downes, supra 
note 6, at 188; Heerey, supra note 8, at 391. 
110 ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, supra note 67, at 32–33. 
111 Id. at 33. 
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tub.  Therefore, such reports are not necessarily indicative of the 
effectiveness of the hot tubbing method but rather reflect the 
challenges that arise from uncertainty in a given field. 
While the subject matter of a case may not have a significant 
bearing on whether hot tubbing is used, characteristics of the experts 
themselves and the presiding judge are important. First, as expressed 
by members of the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, it is 
important that experts have approximately the same level of 
expertise.112  Disparities in expertise levels may create the “potential 
[for] a more junior expert [to] defer to the opinion of the more senior 
expert” in the conversational setting of the hot tub.113  Regardless of 
skill, some experts may be more suited for the hot tub based on their 
personality and speaking ability.  The effectiveness of a particular hot 
tub discussion may be reduced if one expert is less comfortable 
speaking in this forum than the other.  This problem, however, also 
exists in the traditional method of calling each expert to the witness 
stand individually.  Thus, it is likely that the witnesses who are 
hindered by their discomfort in the hot tub would experience at least 
the same degree of discomfort on the stand. 
Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal members were asked 
to identify and rank the top reasons why a hot tub ought to be used in 
specific cases over which they presided.114  The top reason for 
electing to use the hot tub was that “[e]xperts have [the] same level of 
expertise.”115  This was followed—in order of importance—by 
“[e]xperts would be commenting on the same issues,” “[concurrent 
evidence] will clarify some complex issues,” and “[concurrent 
evidence] will improve the objectivity of evidence presented.”116  
These results suggest that when considering whether to utilize the hot 
tub procedure, the qualifications of experts themselves are just as 
important, if not more so, than the particular field of expertise at 
issue. 
The Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal also explored why 
tribunal members chose not to utilize the hot tub in certain 
instances.117  Several commonly stated reasons included that 
 
112 Id. at 29. 
113 Id. at 32. 
114 Id. at 29. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 30. 
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“[e]xperts do not have [the] same level of expertise” and “[e]xperts 
would not be commenting on the same issues.”118  These mirror the 
two highest ranking factors why experts should be subjected to the 
hot tub, emphasize the importance of the factors, and indicate 
consistency in the factors considered important by tribunal members.  
Furthermore, by ranking these as the most dominant reasons why the 
hot tub method was not used, members implied that these factors 
sometimes serve as deal breakers in deciding whether or not the hot 
tub method is appropriate in a given case.  Other reasons reported for 
why the hot tub method was not used included practical reasons such 
as scheduling conflicts among the experts.119 
In addition to the characteristics and personalities of the expert 
witnesses in the hot tub, the presiding judge also plays an important 
role in assuring the procedure’s success.  As the moderator of the 
discussion, the judge can positively impact the procedure by ensuring 
that controversies at issue are identified and discussed.120  This may 
require a significant amount of preparation by the judge, who must 
also ensure the free flow of ideas in the tub and that each participant 
has an adequate opportunity to ask questions and state any views.121  
Because of the preparation and active participation required on the 
part of the judge, a judge should not attempt to facilitate a hot tub 
discussion if he or she does not want, or is not prepared, to serve as 
the hot tub’s moderator. 
VI 
HOT TUBS AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
As mentioned above, applicability of the hot tub method has 
generally been determined on a case-by-case basis by considering 
factors intrinsic to the experts themselves, their testimony, and the 
ability of the presiding judge to serve as an effective moderator.  
Scientific evidence, however, presents unique challenges in the 
courtroom and is frequently plagued by dueling experts.  Do these 
unique aspects make scientific testimony more or less fit for the hot 
tubbing process, or, relatedly, are scientific disputes too complex to 
be heard in this less formal forum? 
 
118 Id. at 31. 
119 See id. 
120 Cheeseman, supra note 8, at 55. 
121 Id. at 55–56. 
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One common frustration when scientists take the witness stand is 
the disconnect between the language of science and the language of 
law.  Many, if not all, laypeople find the jargon and terms of art used 
by attorneys during trial frustrating and hard to follow.  Without legal 
training, knowing exactly what is meant by a phrase like “clear and 
convincing,” or even recognizing that it is a term of art, is 
challenging.  Likewise, scientists have their own jargon that is 
unfamiliar to most nonscientists and does not match up with the 
legalese of the courtroom.122  This linguistic disconnect is particularly 
problematic when a scientist takes the stand as an expert witness.  
Because the average scientist is not fluent in the courtroom language 
of the questioning attorney, there is a risk that the scientist will not 
understand an attorney’s question with the precision the scientist’s 
discipline demands.  When the expert answers what is believed to be 
the attorney’s question, the attorney must quickly translate the 
scientific answer into an understandable form and analyze it 
according to the law.  This disconnect between scientists and lawyers 
creates the risk of misunderstanding important nuances of the 
questions posed and the responding testimony. 
Standards of proof provide a good example of how such “lost in 
translation” problems might arise.123  For scientists, “[s]tatistics gives 
[the] tools to accept conclusions that have a high probability of being 
correct and to reject conclusions that do not.”124  Lawyers, on the 
other hand, do not speak in the mathematical terms of confidence 
intervals and degrees of freedom, but rather in terms of art like 
“preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
The disconnect between these two modes of expression is clear.  
Which confidence interval might a scientist equate to a reasonable 
doubt?  This example is especially pertinent as scientific uncertainty 
often plays a major role in legal disputes, and “understanding . . . the 
degree of uncertainty associated with particular assertions of scientific 
fact” is crucial to evaluating the merits of each side’s arguments.125  
 
122 See, e.g., Charles Weiss, Expressing Scientific Uncertainty, 2 L., PROBABILITY & 
RISK 25, 25 (2003) (identifying this disconnect and proposing a scale that matches a range 
of scientific uncertainty levels to various “standards of proof recognized in the US legal 
system”).  “The scale is intended as a tool to help increase the precision and rationality of 
discourse in controversies in which generalists untrained in natural science must judge the 
merits of opposing arguments in disputes among scientific experts.”  Id. 
123 See, e.g., id. 
124 DANIEL C. HARRIS, QUANTITATIVE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 61 (6th ed. 2003). 
125 Weiss, supra note 122, at 25. 
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Each time necessary translations are made between the attorney and 
scientist, critical information might be lost.  In a hot tub, however, 
when two scientists can speak to each other directly and without 
filtering questions and responses through an attorney, the risk of 
testimony being misunderstood or distorted is reduced. 
VII 
HOT TUBS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The net balance of benefits of the hot tub procedure, including its 
potential to alleviate some of the difficulties associated with complex 
scientific testimony, entice a closer examination of the method’s 
potential application in the United States.  Identifying key similarities 
and differences between the Australian and American judicial systems 
is essential to assess both the procedure’s applicability within the 
United States and how it might be adapted for American courtrooms. 
Similar to the American judiciary, Australian courts employ a 
system of adversarial expert testimony by relying on each side to hire 
and present the testimony of its own experts.  Furthermore, 
“Australian federal judges, like their American counterparts, are 
judicial generalists called upon to resolve cases presenting cutting 
edge technological issues.”126  As a result, judges in Australia 
encounter similar frustrations arising from dueling expert testimony to 
those that plague American courts.  Thus, methods explored and 
developed in Australian courts to combat issues surrounding expert 
testimony may likely have applications in the United States.  The 
judiciaries of Australia and the United States, however, are not 
identical.  A few major differences deserve special consideration and 
may necessitate the modification of Australian-born solutions. 
First, Australian federal courts do not hear criminal trials.127  The 
hot tub method may need significant adjustments before being used in 
any criminal trial to address heightened concerns of due process and 
other rights of the criminal defendant.128  Second, and more 
significantly, juries are not utilized in the Australian federal court 
system.129  As a result, hot tubbing has not been used in an Australian 
 
126 Garbis, supra note 79, at 142. 
127 E.g., id. 
128 Because the Australian judiciary has not implemented the hot tub procedure in a 
criminal trial, this discussion of the method’s use in America will focus solely on civil 
cases. 
129 E.g., Garbis, supra note 79, at 142. 
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jury trial.  The introduction of the jury represents the most significant 
hurdle that the Australian hot tub method faces in American courts. 
Contrary to Australian practices, American civil trials are 
frequently heard in front of a jury.  In a bench trial, the judge can 
participate in hot tub discussions as both a judicial moderator and the 
finder of fact.  This allows the finder of fact in the trial to directly 
question each expert as evidence is presented.  When a jury serves as 
the finder of fact, serious procedural and practical obstacles arise that 
do not exist in a bench trial.  These obstacles essentially bar the jury 
from directly questioning experts and restrict one of the major 
benefits of the hot tub procedure. 
Juror questioning of witnesses must adhere to strict guidelines that 
vary between U.S. jurisdictions.  While some jurisdictions do not 
allow jurors to question witnesses at all, others require that jurors 
submit their questions in writing so each party may review and object 
to a question before it is posed to the witness.130  This procedure 
would be very tedious if the jury had more than a few simple 
questions and would do away with much of the efficiency and relative 
informality associated with the hot tub.  Furthermore, questions 
submitted by jurors are subject to the same rules of evidence that 
apply to questions posed by attorneys when examining an expert 
witness.131  Unlike attorneys, jurors are not versed in evidentiary 
rules and do not understand the nuances of framing fair, 
unobjectionable questions.  Questions posed by a layperson, without 
the guidance of someone trained in the rules, would likely lead to 
objections and bog down hot tub procedures.  Even if this economical 
hindrance were tolerated, strings of impermissible questions could 
have an unduly prejudicial effect on the jury, regardless of whether 
the judge instructed the jury to disregard any submitted questions 
rejected due to counsels’ objections.132 
Practical concerns also arise from the sheer number of jurors who 
may want to participate in the hot tub by questioning a witness.  All 
other evidentiary and procedural concerns aside, up to twelve 
individuals asking questions of two or more experts testifying about 
complex and controversial scientific evidence could easily slide into 
pandemonium.  Without a heavy dose of judicial control, the 
procedure would likely degrade the discussion among experts beyond 
 
130 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 428 (2002). 
131 Id. 
132 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1379 (2007). 
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any reasonable level of productivity.  Methods to manage juror 
questioning would likely be laborious and risk muting any efficiency 
arguments of the hot tub.  Practically speaking, there is simply not 
enough room in the hot tub for an entire jury. 
VIII 
POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS OF THE HOT TUB PROCEDURE 
America’s use of juries, however, need not exclude the hot tub 
procedure from U.S. courtrooms.  Various modifications and 
adaptations can facilitate use of the hot tub in the United States during 
different stages of litigation.  While even modified versions of the 
traditional hot tub procedure will likely remain problematic when 
conducted in the presence of a jury, versions of the procedure may be 
successfully used in American bench trials and various pretrial 
proceedings. 
A.  Jury Trial Hot Tubs Without Juror Participation 
A brief examination of the implications of inviting a jury into the 
hot tub exposes the reality that hot tubs in the context of a jury trial 
must exclude the finder of fact.  While this eliminates the advantage 
of being able to question experts directly, the hot tub may still be a 
useful tool in jury trials without juror participation.  The benefits of 
efficiency, increased comfort levels of experts, contemporaneous 
examination, and quick reduction of the issues to key areas of dispute 
would all remain. 
However, legitimate concerns still arise from a jury listening in on 
a hot tub discussion between counselors, experts, and the judge, as 
concerns over the propriety of questions arise when experts pose their 
own questions.  Just like those posed by jurors, questions asked by 
experts in normal hot tub discussion are unlikely to conform to 
evidentiary rules.  If counsel were to object to each nonconforming 
question, the effectiveness of the hot tub would be greatly reduced if 
not eliminated.  In a bench trial, where hot tubs are traditionally 
utilized, the judge acts as the finder of fact and is also familiar with 
evidentiary requirements for examination questions.  As such, the 
judge can identify aspects of questions that are objectionable and 
disregard aspects that are unduly prejudicial.  In nonjury trials where 
hot tubs are used, counsel for each party must trust the judge’s ability 
to evaluate the questioning and resulting testimony appropriately.  
Jurors, however, are not trained to filter testimony that would or 
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would not be admitted as evidence under traditional examination 
methods where formal objections are made to all nonconforming 
questions.  The prejudicial effect of the jury listening to the experts’ 
objectionable questioning may outweigh the significant benefits 
associated with the hot tub. Thus, even when jurors are excluded from 
actively participating, conducting a hot tub in front of a jury still 
raises significant concerns. 
B.  Use in American Bench Trials 
As in Australia, the hot tub may, and should, be utilized in 
American bench trials.  Bench trial use of the hot tub eliminates the 
procedural concerns of a jury while preserving the benefits of the hot 
tub.  In light of the judiciary’s and expert witnesses’ continued and 
long-standing frustration with the current mode of expert testimony, 
motivated judges should initiate trial runs of the Australian-born hot 
tub procedure for bench trials in their courtrooms.  The likelihood of 
the hot tub’s success in the United States depends on judges who are 
willing to experiment with this new procedure in hopes of alleviating 
the long-recognized, yet unresolved, flaws of the current system of 
adversarial expert testimony.  Initial uses of the hot tub in American 
bench trials will illuminate specific opportunities for further 
procedural modifications as well as the method’s potential application 
in other stages of U.S. litigation.  Given the substantial benefits of the 
procedure in Australian bench trials,133  U.S. courts should 
experiment with the procedure during bench trials with suitable expert 
witness evidence.134 
C.  Modification for Use in Pretrial Proceedings 
In addition to using the hot tub in American bench trials, a 
modified version of the procedure may prove useful in U.S. pretrial 
procedures.135  Daubert hearings, which occur before trial and are not 
subject to evidentiary rules, may prove to be an excellent venue for 
the hot tub.  This modified version would closely resemble the 
 
133 See supra Part IV.A. 
134 See supra Part V (discussing factors that make particular cases suitable for the hot 
tub method). 
135 This modification of moving the hot tub to pretrial procedures is only appropriate 
where the identities of expert witnesses are revealed before trial.  See Davies, supra note 
66, at 398.  In jurisdictions such as Oregon, where the identities of experts are kept secret 
until they are called to testify, there is still a possibility that the hot tub might be used 
before trial if all parties agree to reveal their expert witnesses in pretrial proceedings. 
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standard hot tub procedure and could significantly help the judge’s 
efforts to identify merits and flaws of particular expert testimony, 
ultimately aiding in the determination of whether the testimony is 
admissible.  Moving the hot tub to pretrial proceedings eliminates 
concerns arising from conducting the discussion in front of a jury 
while preserving many of the method’s benefits.  The hot tub’s ability 
to narrow contested issues and clarify the root of experts’ 
disagreements would aid judges’ attempts to evaluate complex 
scientific testimony presented by opposing experts during Daubert 
hearings.  Moving the hot tub to pretrial proceedings may render it 
less effective than its courtroom counterpart, however, as pertinent 
issues in the case might be less fully developed during pretrial stages 
than they are when experts are called to testify during trial.  Even so, 
the colloquial format of the hot tub would at least begin to clarify and 
narrow the actual issues in dispute before a trial even begins.  This 
alteration might raise the costs of standard pretrial proceedings; 
however, the benefits conferred by the hot tub method likely 
outweigh this cost increase. 
The hot tub method could also be modified for use during pretrial 
depositions.  This innovation would require experts suitable for an in-
court hot tub to conduct a similar procedure, under oath, during a 
pretrial deposition.  Experts and counsel would engage in discussion 
similar to traditional hot tub proceedings but facilitated by a 
moderator other than the judge.  This significant modification to the 
Australian model removes the finder of fact from the discussion 
entirely and eliminates problems predicted to arise in jury trials.  
Moving the procedure to the pretrial deposition would also avoid 
issues of conforming to evidentiary rules.  Though this procedure 
would likely require a moderator to facilitate the discussion, resulting 
in an initial cost increase, the benefits conferred by this procedure 
could easily make up for added costs.  Significantly, using the hot tub 
in pretrial depositions would allow experts to converse with one 
another directly, efficiently narrow the issues in dispute, and reduce 
the time needed to present their views during trial.  The procedure 
may also increase the comfort of expert witnesses by allowing them 
to be deposed in a more familiar setting.136  Furthermore, identifying 
the points of contention between experts’ testimonies during pretrial 
depositions may decrease the adversarial tension often experienced by 
 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 82–88 (discussing increased comfort levels of 
experts in the hot tub setting). 
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experts during courtroom examination.  Ideally, this method would 
result in experts either agreeing on, or possibly stipulating to, 
undisputed points, thereby reducing what ought to be further 
examined during trial to clearly disputed issues, which would increase 
efficiency.137 
CONCLUSION 
The Australian-born hot tubbing method is an innovative approach 
to the longstanding and systemic problems of adversarial expert 
testimony.  Although arguably less than perfect, hot tubbing boasts 
significant advantages over the traditional method of direct and cross-
examination, while still preserving the benefits associated with each 
party providing their own expert testimony.  These benefits and the 
preservation of multiple expert viewpoints are especially appealing 
when expert testimony concerns complex scientific findings or 
conclusions.  Though significant differences between the American 
and Australian judiciaries prevent a seamless integration of the hot 
tub procedure into American courts, the procedure could be adapted 
for use in the United States.  Whether modified for use in pretrial 
depositions, Daubert hearings, or adopted substantially unchanged for 
U.S. bench trials, many of the beneficial attributes of the Australian 
hot tubbing method would survive the adaptations necessary for use 
in U.S. courts.  Thus, while significant modifications may be 
required, the basics of Australian hot tubs may be imported to the 
United States, providing significant improvements in the presentation 
and evaluation of scientific expert testimony. 
 
137 It is important to remember that the primary purpose of depositions is to gather 
information relevant to each party’s claim or defense.  Thus, depositions are not an 
appropriate venue for either adversarial disputes among counsel and their experts or a form 
of mini-trial to declare the validity of the experts’ opinions.  These situations can be 
avoided if the intended colloquial nature of the hot tub is adhered to and the goals of the 
procedure are established as both determining the opinions of each expert and pinpointing 
where such opinions overlap.  These goals conform to the information-gathering purpose 
of depositions and may serve as a more efficient way to narrow the experts’ testimony to 
the disputed issues. 
